Argentina's economy is in dire straits. Unemployment has grown to pandemic levels according to official reports (see also this), and one every four people are over-employed. Homelessness keeps rising, and at least according to an NGO 25% of homeless people became homeless in the last year. A constant decline in industrial activity has taken it to levels similar to those of 2007, with factories closing every day.
But even so, Milei keeps accumulating electoral successes. His presidential campaign went very well and now he has won the legislative elections in astonishing fashion. I can think of two factors to account for this: the failure of Peronism, and the lowering of inflation.
In a way, the lowering of inflation carries more of a psychological than an economical weight. Though certainly a positive of Milei's government, it is little more than a consequence of the contraction of economic activity I mentioned at the beginning. The lowering of inflation does not necessarily indicate an improvement in the overall economy but is rather a consequence of its infirmity.
That said, we must put ourselves in the shoes of the poor individuals in our country, which comprise the great majority, and understand the desperation which the spiking inflation generated in previous governments. People that underestimate this are usually relatively secured against inflation through some mechanism, e.g. members of the judicial system who can virtually decide on their own salary raises. Inflation, specially hyper or close to hyperinflation, can drive a people to irrational despair. So even though life conditions have not improved for anyone, and even though Milei's government has stabilized the currency by means of shattering the economy, the lowering of inflation is still felt by most people as a major relief.
With regards to the failures of the last Peronist administrations, and the hate and anger which Peronism brews, there is little to add to what's already commonplace. Yet Peronism is such a resilient movement that it will likely, and perhaps for the worse, come back stronger if time is given.
As a side note, I must admit that I do not understand Peronism. I just can't wrap my head around it, and I doubt anyone can. It is undeniably a pseudo-ideology, a phenomenon which can only be described from the lenses of anthropology or sociology, but not political theory.
Originally, it was a right-wing, proto-fascist movement, with an established track record of human right violations, censorship and oppression. Yet the mixture of this violence with a welfare state, a blatant yet appealing populism, and certain undeniable achievements (such as universal healthcare and labor rights), made an indelible impression in the nation. From then on Peronism evolved with several, mutually contradicting expressions: a communist and catholic guerrilla (?) in Montoneros, the fascist paramilitary group AAA (which counted with Peron's approval), and the Kirchner's moderate progressivism, all claimed to themselves the name of peronist. It is the incoherence which underlies this chaos what I mean to express when calling it pseudo-ideological. Less pedantically, I mean to say that Peronism is about power, not about ideology: its alignment derives vertically from leading figures, and policy making is carried out in ad hoc fashion.
Some peronist governments had undeniable achievements and merits, but in general I do not think Peronism is a force of good in Argentina. It has however successfully branded in the worker man's mind the idea that any betterment of his conditions is impossible without it. This is particularly tragic if we consider that Peronism is not a worker's movement. If the movement lacks any philosophical substance, then it particularly lacks the libertarian principle according to which the workers themselves should have the right of controlling their own activity, rather than depending on the beneficence of a superior yet generous leader. This was of course resisted at first, but all resistance was suppressed.
Whatever the case, and going back to our topic, the last Peronist government was such a profound disappointment to every day people, who saw their economy shattered, that the emergence of a pseudo-messianic element such as Milei's so-called libertarianism was tremendously appealing. It is this, and not an economic success, what explains Milei's electoral achievements. He is still in time to claim that current issues are aftertastes of Peronism, a claim which is not entirely true. Though disastrous in monetary terms, the last Peronist administration did have some successes. It managed to rebound industry significantly after the COVID pandemic and economic activity within the sector showed a real, albeit non-uniform increase. Now, after "libertarian" deterioration, historical companies such as Celulosa Argentina went bankrupt, education funding is squalid, the health system is in dire straits, and science and research were destroyed.
With regards to public spending on health, science and education, we are all familiar with the following simplification: "the left" wants a big state with huge spending, sometimes beyond its budget; "the right" wants a small state that takes care only of the most essential. As most simplifications, this is false. The common argument that science, education, and health are in dire straits because the state should not or cannot support them financially is false, as well as the claim that Milei's government aims at a small state. Milei has drastically increased expenditure in surveillance and intelligence and plans to do the same with the military. (See this entry for a more specific report.) Both Peronism and Milei's movement aim at a big and very present state. They simply disagree on where its spending should go and what aims its presence should seek to achieve.
In any case, now that Milei has won the legislative elections, the worse is yet to come. Argentina's economy will most likely continue to plunge and we will all continue to see our neighbours, friends and lovers struggling to make ends meet. Now I recall a year ago finding my neighbour, a pensioner, begging for food on the street. I do not live in a poor neighbourhood. He had a fine apartment in a fine place of the city. But Milei's cuts to pensions forced him to beg for bread. I think of him often, because he isn't a statistic: I would often cross him in the street and say good morning. And I boil in vengeful anger when I recall his hunger.