A few days ago, the United States performed a swift operation in Venezuela, cutting its electrical power, bombing strategic facilities, and abducting Nicolás Maduro, all in the course of approximately three hours. As early as February 2025, the Trump administration accused Maduro of organizing criminal activity with the Tren de Aragua organization, a claim that contradicted US intelligence [1]. On March, Trump imposed 25% tariffs to all countries importing crude oil or petroleum products extracted, refined, or exported from Venezuela [2, 3]. In October, Trump explicitly authorized the CIA to carry out secret operations in Venezuela [4], and it seems Maduro was under constant surveillance by stealth drones prior to his abduction [5]. In November, the United States announced the «Southern Spear» mission, with numerous, unlawful attacks on Caribbean vessels which the US claims—with no evidence—were trafficking drugs [6, 7, 8]. During the same month, the US deployed the largest aircraft carrier to the Caribbean and near the coast of Venezuela [9] and effectively closed Venezuelan airspace [10]. So Maduro's abduction is nothing but the foreseeable culmination of relatively open and transparent events.
Discussions of these events, in my opinion, revolve too much around the personal figure of Maduro. Though not extensively, I have written about the blatant human rights violations under Maduro's regime elsewhere [11] and have been following Amnesty International's coverage of political violence and repression in the country. I do not wish to repeat myself nor dwell on all-too-known facts, accepting not only that Maduro's regime was brutal and corrupt, but also that the 2024 elections were likely fraudulent and sustained only by unacceptable violence and use of force [12].
But internal corruption or government violence do not justify exterior intervention, neither morally nor legally. The US actions are a direct violation of the UN Charter, which prohibits «threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state» [13]. The act unequivocally constitutes the Crime of Aggression as specified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [14]—though both the US and Venezuela withdrew from the statute [15, 16], obviously because neither could seriously claim to respect its clauses—.
If one accepts that domestic corruption or authoritarianism justifies regime change, invasion, or any other form of foreign aggression, one must then elaborate an impossible argument detailing how and who determines which governments are corrupt or not. Furthermore, one must readily accept and in fact endorse that similar actions be taken, effective immediately, against equally corrupt states, such as those of Saudi Arabia, Israel, or Serbia. In fact, as should be evident, accepting this principle would lead to such general chaos that human civilization would become an impossible project.
There is, I grant, one sense in which Maduro's own political gravitas may be relevant to understanding the events hereby described. Namely, that had he not been a brutal oppressor, the reputational cost of overthrowing him would have been greater, perhaps sufficiently greater so as to discourage such direct operation. But this is speculative, and in general terms one should examine the overthrow of Maduro independently of the fact that he was a dictator.
Venezuela, as everyone knows, is rich in oil, and Donald Trump has declared US will run the country and tap into its oil reserves [17]. In fact, the shares of US oil companies are already on a rise [18]. Trump declared that Venezuela had «stolen» US oil through force. In fact, Venezuelan oil was nationalized in 1976—decades before Chávez came to power—with $1 billion dollars being agreed as compensation for oil companies [19, 20]. Venezuela is also rich in coltan [21], coal, gold, and gas [22, 23], all of which are important resources.
Venezuela is not only an economic interest, but a geopolitical one. Securing Venezuelan oil means not only revenue for the United States but cutting Russian and Chinese access to it. Russia and Venezuela had long-standing and multi-millionaire oil deals [24]. Venezuela is the fourth-biggest recipient of loans from China—the US is the first—and prior to Maduro's abduction, most of Venezuelan oil was being sold to China and the US [25]. The Cuban government, which still has a powerful symbolic charge attached to it, strongly depended on Venezuelan oil [26], and Trump has stated that «Cuba is ready to fall» [27].
The openness with which the United States committed this illegal attack, as well as the transparency of its motives, should be unsurprising when viewed as nothing but a continuation of the long-standing Monroe doctrine. Henchmen and minions are rewarded, while anyone opposing US interests is more or less brutally destroyed. But however unsurprising, the record being set is preoccupying. The Trump administration is hardening its grip on the Western hemisphere, making dangerous military threats to Colombia [28] and Denmark [29].
The reestablishment of the Monroe doctrine is explicitly declared in the last National Security Strategy [30], released in December 2025, where US foreign policy is framed. As usual, this official document is frank about the US's imperial ambitions. It begins declaring that «the sole purpose» of US foreign policy is «the protection of core national interests». These interests, the document claims, have been cast aside in favor of globalism and free trade, lashing US policy to an international order which is anti-American. A key objective is to «maintain the United States’ unrivaled “soft power” through which we exercise positive influence throughout the world that furthers our interests», accurately adding that this soft power is only effective if the population is persuaded of the «inherent greatness and decency» of their country. For this an other purposes, the document declares that «we will assert and enforce a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine». An when declaring «predisposition to non-interventionism» as a principle of international affairs, the document rapidly adds that «for a country whose interests are as numerous and diverse as ours, rigid adherence to non-interventionism is not possible». These are only a few of its passages relevant to understanding the US intervention in Venezuela. The reader is encouraged to consult the full text [30].
More and more, the US claims that international law is meaningless. Stephen Miller, Trump's chief of staff, upholds a view of international affairs where «might makes right» and has stated that the US will «unapologetically» use military force [31]. Trump has claimed he «doesn't need international law», for his only constraint is «his own morality» [32]. In a recent live interview for Al Jazeera, the Republican strategist Adolfo Franco claimed that, in the «real politics of the world», international law is «at best an honor code» [33], ultimately meaningless due to its lack of enforcement mechanisms. I find no problem in recognizing that international law has been repeatedly violated with impunity by several powerful actors—the US and Israel above them all— but rather than considering this a reason to surrender international law as a futile endeavor, it should be taken as a reason to reaffirm its importance and to develop better mechanisms for its enforcement to regulate international affairs. The alternative is to return to a pre-modern state of lawlessness, where powerful states are free to carry out their imperial ambitions with no regard for sovereignty, self-determination, or human rights.
The removal of Nicolás Maduro, as should be clear by now, falls well within the US's renewed doctrine of hemispheric dominance. Trump's administration continuously signals that the principles of non-intervention and self-determination are subordinate to US strategic interests. We cannot accept this revival of the Monroe Doctrine as a «necessary evil» in the overthrow of a dictator, as doing so implicitly consents to the erosion of the very legal frameworks designed to prevent global conflict. It is now commonplace to claim that international law is meaningless, with hegemons acting as they please in both hemispheres. But we must insist on international law, if only because it is all we have.